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From Parameters, Winter 1998, pp. 39-50.

It was clear to some in the US peace operations policy community during the late 1980s and early 1990s that there
were serious, recurring problems in preparing for and conducting international crisis intervention missions. In the early
years, the military frequently developed its plans independently of the other government agencies involved in a crisis.
When identifying tasks and the resources to perform them, the absence of links between the civilian and military
components of these missions led to undesirable outcomes: neglect of civil police requirements and other law and
order functions, resource imbalances between humanitarian relief initiatives and military operations, and lack of
attention to human rights considerations. The uncoordinated planning produced serious differences in assumptions,
concepts, policy recommendations, and plans.
The separate planning processes seldom identified a complete set of strategic objectives and operational needs for these
interventions. As a result there was no thoughtful review of all the requirements related to the plan nor an appreciation
of the coordination required for success. Consequently, while opinions vary regarding the events that finally led to a
new initiative for managing US crisis interventions, there was a clear consensus that the US interagency community
had to improve its processes for establishing policy and reaching decisions about US participation in such
interventions. The goal of the initiative was to ensure that a complete and balanced division of tasks and
responsibilities would exist between the civilian and military components of any intervention before US assets were
committed to the operation.
For some of those in the policy community charged with overseeing small-scale deployments, the light went on during
the Grenada intervention; for others, illumination occurred during Operation Just Cause. But few remained in the dark
after October 1993, when American military personnel died in the streets of Mogadishu. Subsequent interventions in
Rwanda (1994) and Haiti (1995) and the current mission in Bosnia reflect many of the lessons learned since 1989. The
later interventions have focused attention and pressure on the US interagency process, with a view toward doing
everything possible to get policy and management plans about right before sending in the troops.
On 20 May 1997, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56) "The Clinton Administration's
Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations," to improve the political, military, humanitarian, economic,
and other dimensions of the US government's planning for interventions that are identified as complex emergencies.
This article describes how the interagency community developed this significant new crisis management tool, and
discusses the directive's central features: intent and expectations, assumption management, and key planning elements.
The article then explores in depth one of the directive's most unusual features: the requirement for annual training of
the Washington interagency team responsible for developing policy to deal with complex emergencies.
The Requirement to Improve
During the 1990s a number of crises produced large displacements of civilian populations, both internally and beyond
their national borders, on a scale that transcended the ability of civilian humanitarian relief organizations to respond
effectively. While much of this turmoil occurred in Africa, more recent events in the Balkans have been marked by
comparable savagery. Disruption of commerce, agriculture, and industry, loss of control by central governments, and
predatory interventions by neighboring states or native rogue elements have all contributed to daily death tolls in the
thousands and refugees in the hundreds of thousands. Traditional relief mechanisms and the government, business, and
volunteer organizations that for years had been adequate to meet the need for relief were revealed to be inefficient,
ineffective, or both when dealing with crises involving an entire nation. Challenges of this magnitude gradually came
to be described as complex emergencies.

While the terms "complex emergencies" and PDD-56's "complex contingency operations" sound similar, some
distinctions between the two are worth noting. The common understanding of a "complex emergency" is derived from
the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, which uses the term to define a humanitarian
crisis in a country or region in which there is a total collapse of authority from internal or external conflicts and which
requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency. Such crises can
include humanitarian considerations, rehabilitation of political institutions, and economic reconstruction. The
expression "complex contingency operations," in the words of the National Security Advisor, refers to "crises,
including some resulting from natural disasters, [that] require multi-dimensional responses composed of several
components such as political, diplomatic, intelligence, humanitarian, economic, and security: hence the term `complex
contingency operations.'"[1]
Before the appearance of PDD-56, the lack of meaningful coordinated planning produced serious setbacks whenever
Washington attempted to manage complex emergencies. Perhaps the most compelling case for reforming the US
government's policy planning processes is found in our experiences in Somalia involving the US-led Unified Task
Force (UNITAF) and forces deployed under the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II) between late
1992 and early 1995. Vague or unclear strategic interests, objectives, and responsibilities during the transfer of policy
oversight from UNITAF to UNOSOM II contributed to the ensuing calamity and eventual failure and withdrawal of
UNOSOM II. While a planning and management procedure involving the entire US policy community might have
improved the prospects for success in that ill-fated intervention, the US experience in Somalia at least challenged the
Washington interagency community to examine and correct its policymaking processes and procedures.
Small rays of hope appeared during the run-up to comparable US-led and UN missions in Haiti in late 1994. Those
experienced in complex emergencies, primarily military peace operations planners, recognized that mission
requirements in Haiti extended well beyond the purview and capabilities of the US and other military forces preparing
for the intervention. Indeed, nonmilitary tasks and responsibilities of the US-led Multinational Force and the United
Nations Mission in Haiti became the focus of questions from both the US Atlantic Command, which was responsible
for the military theater of operations, and the Washington policy community. As planning began, US Atlantic
Command identified a host of questions related to tasks and responsibilities that were well beyond the capability of
military forces committed to the operation. These questions from the military required fully coordinated answers from
other parts of the US government.
The military inquiry into stated and derived tasks that were beyond its means to fulfill went to planners in departments
and agencies outside of DOD. The queries became the basis for integrated political and military plans to resolve the
Haitian crisis and to conduct the subsequent peace operation. The National Security Council (NSC), assisted by the
Pentagon's joint staff military planners, developed and produced a civil-military plan for the Haiti mission that
resembled the military's operations order. All involved in this collaborative effort concluded that NSC participation in
any such planning was essential if the plan was to succeed. Subsequent NSC interest in reforming policy for US
participation in complex emergencies put it squarely behind efforts to help the interagency community improve itself.
The Directive
The intent of PDD-56 is to define a specific US national governmental policy planning process--one related to
managing complex emergencies--to achieve unity of effort within and among the responsible federal agencies.[2] The
directive seeks to reduce delays and eliminate redundancy that had marked responses to some earlier emergencies; it
also is intended to help agencies avoid overextending their capabilities. It follows that close coordination and
cooperation among those charged with crisis intervention also diminish the risk of incorrect or inappropriate use of
resources.
When fully implemented, the PDD-56 management process is expected to reduce confusion and delay in getting
organized by identifying and directing missions and tasks appropriate to each of the federal departments and agencies
charged with responding to a complex emergency. With missions and tasks identified and allocated to the appropriate
bodies, expectations are that an effective strategy can be developed early in the crisis response cycle. Early agreement
on national policy objectives should have several useful outcomes: rapid identification of potential policy gaps or
redundancies, accelerated planning and implementation within non-DOD elements of the government, early

identification of resource shortfalls and preparation of plans to address them, and development of an integrated
national-level strategic plan which can provide direction for plans and actions at the operational level and below.
PDD-56 defines a process that can facilitate the integration and coordination of civilian and military efforts to respond
to complex emergencies.
It is useful to explain first what the provisions of PDD-56 are not designed to achieve. The directive is not intended to
provide policy oversight for responses to domestic disasters, terrorism, noncombatant evacuations, or, at the other end
of the conflict spectrum, international armed hostilities. And it is not the purpose of the directive's planning process to
determine whether the United States should deploy US government personnel, military or civilian, in response to a
crisis. Other documents, such as the Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD-25), promulgated in
1994, were prepared to help policymakers reach sound conclusions about conflict prevention and resolution and to help
shape decisions about committing the United States to intervene in humanitarian crises. Should PDD-25 deliberations
conclude that intervention is needed, the US interagency process would then determine the role of US government
organizations in the intervention. PDD-56 was created to guide the process of integrating diplomatic, military,
humanitarian, and other responses to complex emergencies, but only after a decision to intervene has been made.
The intent of the directive is that the US government would respond to a complex emergency as a member of a
coalition while retaining the option to act alone if required. The strengths and weaknesses of a military response to
these kinds of crises are recognized, as is the cost of an open-ended commitment of military forces to resolve the
conflict. Operations that fall within the purview of PDD-56 range from peace accord implementation, such as the
operation presently under way in Bosnia, through humanitarian intervention similar to Operation Provide Comfort in
Northern Iraq in 1992-93, to humanitarian relief such as Operation Support Hope in Rwanda in 1994.
The team of interagency personnel that will assemble to take responsibility for recommending and implementing policy
in these kinds of contingencies is tailored to meet the operational requirements of the crisis at hand. At a minimum,
interagency-approved strategies and plans to define the range of tasks to be undertaken will be needed for diplomatic
initiatives, military stability and weapons control, humanitarian relief, refugee and displaced persons programs, civil
police and criminal justice reconstruction, economic rehabilitation, and public information campaigns directed at the
regional target audience. Mine clearing, demobilization, elections, war crimes, and human rights violations may be
other important aspects of a crisis that demand attention by the policy community.
Once a range of issues has been identified, a diverse group of national government officials assembles to evaluate
them and then develop US policy for an extremely complex crisis environment. Staffs that routinely work together--the
NSC, the State Department, and the Department of Defense--are joined by partners not traditionally involved in crisis
management, including, but not limited to, the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Justice, the
Treasury Department, the US Agency for International Development, and possibly a representative from the US
Mission to the United Nations. Add to this new policy team input from field offices of the US government, regional
bodies, the United Nations, and nongovernmental organizations, and it soon becomes apparent why interagency
commonality of purpose and unity of effort can be elusive.
PDD-56 also provides for an Executive Committee (EXCOMM) to supervise the production of the strategic plan. The
EXCOMM is established by Department Deputy Secretaries through their Deputies Committee, and provides day-today management of US participation in the crisis. The EXCOMM is responsible for policy development, planning,
oversight, and implementation. It is composed of Department Assistant Secretaries who constitute a standing crisis
action group that includes all appropriate federal departments and agencies, including those that are normally outside
the interagency working group structure. The EXCOMM is also directed by PDD-56 to ensure that lessons learned
from previous missions are regularly and routinely made available to those managing the operational process. The
EXCOMM relies on proven management, coordinating, and integrating procedures to improve the prospects for
success in complex emergencies.
The EXCOMM's responsibilities include determination of valid tasks and responsibilities, early intervention and
resolution of the crisis, synchronization of civilian and military planning timelines, timely identification of necessary
resources, and satisfaction of personnel and funding requirements. Perhaps the most important node in the emerging
structure for managing complex emergencies, the EXCOMM keeps pace with crisis events, assesses responses to those

events, seeks to anticipate problems, assigns tasks, and monitors planning and operations in each of the federal
agencies involved in the crisis. When anticipating actions and coordinating tasks, the EXCOMM uses an integrated
interagency plan to identify critical issues, establish priorities, evaluate agency concepts of operation, and organize
planning reviews. It brings unsolved problems and issues to the attention of the Deputies Committee for decisions. Of
perhaps greatest significance for all concerned, the EXCOMM is responsible for conducting an interagency afteraction review of the intervention.
The principal provision in the directive for rationalizing civilian and military contributions to the policy process is the
political-military implementation plan. Commonly referred to as the "pol-mil plan," it is a vitally important product for
developing the policy and associated operations plans needed to resolve the crisis. The intent of the pol-mil plan is to
provide direction for a comprehensive assessment of the crisis, which in turn helps to forge a consensus on the
intervention's purpose, mission, and ends. It also helps to outline coordinating mechanisms and to identify participants'
responsibilities and priorities. The plan includes assessments, mission, objectives, end-state, concept of operations and
organization, preparatory tasks, functional tasks that broadly apply to crisis responses, mission specific tasks, and
participating agencies' mission area plans. Finally, the pol-mil plan establishes agency accountability, ensures that each
agency's planning process is understood by all participants, and identifies legal disconnects and resource shortfalls.
Two other features of PDD-56 are worth noting before discussing the directive's training requirement. First, prior to
the commitment of resources in the mission area, the pol-mil plan is to be rehearsed by the interagency team. The
purpose of the rehearsal is to refine and sharpen the integration of what can be a broad collection of individual agency
implementation plans that must come together in a unified and strategically coherent manner. Directed by the Deputies
Committee, the rehearsal reviews the agencies' mission area plans, establishes the basis for synchronizing all US
government operational activities in the crisis area, resolves competing priorities and perspectives, and highlights
agency accountability and critical resource issues. A comparable rehearsal is to be conducted before each key
milestone in the plan, such as in preparation for the transition from one phase of the operation to another.
A second important, if not unique, aspect of PDD-56 is its requirement for an interagency after-action review at the
conclusion of US participation in the intervention. The review includes a comprehensive assessment of the operation to
analyze the performance of the Washington policy team and US operations in the crisis area. As with all after-action
reviews, every effort is made to capture relevant lessons from the operation to improve the prospects for success in
future interventions. What is unique to the PDD-56 review is the requirement for the EXCOMM to distribute lessons
learned throughout the interagency community (not just to those that participated in the operation) and to integrate the
lessons into policy, procedures, and operational practice. This EXCOMM responsibility, together with the requirement
for cosponsored annual training for the interagency peace operations policy community, sets PDD-56 apart from other
presidential directives.
Interagency Training
Most organizations, civilian and military alike, understand the importance of training their work force. This part of the
analysis of PDD-56 examines that proposition in the context of the US federal government's interagency system of
management and crisis response.
Incomplete or failed integration of non-DOD agencies into the development of strategy and plans for responding to
complex emergencies can undermine unity of effort in execution. It can also result in demands for the military to
perform tasks outside its range of skills and competencies. Deficiencies in the interagency process could extend the
military's involvement in an intervention beyond the need for unique military personnel and assets to cope with the
complex emergency.
The Requirement
The training program mandated by PDD-56 is intended to familiarize key members of the US federal government's
interagency community--at the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office Director, and their staffs--with lessons
learned from complex contingency operations. It also has as an objective defining and describing the most current
planning tools and procedures in the political-military planning process.

PDD-56 requires the National Security Council to develop and conduct an interagency training program for managing
complex emergencies. The program, to be presented annually, is supported by the State Department and the
Department of Defense, and is conducted in conjunction with the appropriate US federal educational institutions,
including the National Defense University, the National Foreign Affairs Training Center, and the Army War College
(US Army Peacekeeping Institute). The training familiarizes federal officials with processes and procedures for
developing and implementing pol-mil plans to deal with complex emergencies. Those participating in the training have
an opportunity to interact with experienced federal agency practitioners and with experienced members of field
organizations to learn what was or was not effective in previous operations. PDD-56 calls upon all appropriate federal
educational institutions to explore ways to incorporate the pol-mil planning process into their curricula and for federal
agencies to develop their own internal training programs on the topic.[3]
The intent of PDD-56 with regard to training is to establish the pol-mil planning process within the interagency
community as the way to respond to complex emergencies. That process has to deal with a vast array of topics that
must be included in policy deliberations, and do so effectively in a very short time without all the information needed
to make decisions. Political, military, humanitarian, economic, environmental, and less obvious considerations are
subject to examination. All are essential to a comprehensive understanding of the range of peace operations policy and
to a well-coordinated and complete pol-mil planning process. The PDD-56 training program is designed to sharpen
agency officials' planning skills and to give them an opportunity to discover the utility of the pol-mil planning process
by participating in a simulated crisis situation.
For the planning process to respond to lessons derived from actual operations, the after-action review is an essential
first step to understanding what succeeded, what failed, and why each outcome occurred in an operation. In
compliance with the provisions of PDD-56, the EXCOMM initiates an after-action review involving those who
participated in the operation on the ground and those who monitored its conduct from outside the theater of operations.
The assessment includes a review of interagency planning and coordination, both in Washington and in the field, legal
and budgetary difficulties encountered, and proposed solutions to problems. Without constant feedback and updating,
the pol-mil planning process could become outdated; the after-action review and subsequent dissemination of the
results are intended to ensure that good ideas are carried forward, unsuccessful initiatives are analyzed, and that both
are disseminated throughout the community to better prepare for the next crisis.
Training
A training program for the US interagency community was initiated late in 1995; it resulted in the conduct of a pilot
training session in February 1996 and a subsequent session in December 1996. The success of these early attempts at
interagency training and the release of PDD-56 in May 1997 led to the first formal training session for the US federal
interagency community in mid-December 1997.[4]
The first formal "Interagency Training and Education Program for Complex Contingency Operations" came about as a
result of a joint effort by the National Security Council Staff, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense.
The stated purpose was to enhance interagency planning and coordination for complex contingency operations. It was
cosponsored by the Foreign Service Institute, National Defense University, and the US Army Peacekeeping Institute,
under the direction of the Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Global Issues and Multinational
Affairs on the National Security Council. Approximately 70 participants and ten observers attended.[5]
The goals of this first training session were to:
Improve US government interagency management and support of complex contingency operations.
Institutionalize the interagency lessons learned in planning and developing an integrated US response to a
complex contingency.
Enhance interagency cooperation and coordination by developing an understanding of the interests, capabilities,
and limitations of the various US government agencies that participate in or support US responses to complex
contingencies.[6]
The session lasted two and a half days and included guest speakers, panel discussions, and a scenario-based pol-mil
simulation. Speakers and panel discussants were asked to share insights on interagency lessons learned from recent

complex contingency operations in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Bosnia. Participants were provided the opportunity to
use and become familiar with the pol-mil planning process, develop key portions of the pol-mil plan (the assessment,
mission statement, overall concept, end state, general agency concepts, and mission area team concepts), manipulate
the planning decision support software developed at National Defense University, and conduct an interagency rehearsal
in a realistic, simulated interagency environment.[7]
The Pol-Mil Simulation
The simulation provided hands-on experience in developing and coordinating the pol-mil plan for a simulated complex
emergency in northeast Asia. The objectives of the simulation were to:
Discuss interagency lessons learned, current issues, and initiatives in developing, planning, and managing an
integrated US response to complex contingencies based on recent US experiences, through panel and speaker
presentations and discussions.
Clarify and understand interagency tasks and responsibilities, and the implications of these lessons for
coordinating and developing a US government response to a complex contingency, through panel and speaker
presentations and discussions.
Familiarize participants with the pol-mil plan outline and planning process through hands-on experience in
developing selected aspects of the pol-mil plan in an interagency simulation exercise.
Familiarize participants with the interagency rehearsal and its purpose in pol-mil planning and interagency
coordination through hands-on experience in an interagency rehearsal simulation exercise.
Emphasize selected key issues in interagency coordination through an interagency simulation exercise.
Create an opportunity for networking and familiarity between individuals of different agencies to enhance
coordination for real-world complex contingency operations.[8]
A game book was constructed which helped participants prepare for the training and provided a reference for future
involvement in the interagency planning process. Among the items provided to participants was what was then referred
to as "The US Pol-Mil Implementation Plan Handbook" and associated software for the Planning Decision Support
System (PDSS) computer program.[9<P255BJ0> Participants were also encouraged to bring relevant information and
materials from their respective offices to explain agency perspectives and to develop agency portions of the pol-mil
plan during the simulation game.
During the assessment phase, participants reviewed specific examples of potential tasks outlined in the pol-mil plan
handbook. Source materials from agency historical files and experiences from previous operations conducted in the
Asia-Pacific region provided a basis for developing agency estimates and concepts of operation. The references
included estimates of resource requirements, time lines for planning and execution, points of contact from selected
international and other organizations and agencies that were consulted, and background data on refugees and displaced
persons. Humanitarian organizations routinely operating in the region and representative issues associated with
regional humanitarian assistance were also discussed.
During the first phase of the simulation, participants were to develop agency perspectives regarding the situation
presented and an introductory view of the mission from their agency's perspective. Guest speakers and a group of
distinguished panelists helped shape that outcome. In the second phase, agency Deputy Assistant Secretaries joined the
exercise to refine and integrate the assessment and the mission statement previously developed by the entire planning
group. Participants were asked to present the views and perspectives of their respective agencies throughout the
interagency simulation. Mission area teams were organized to undertake the development of concepts of operations for
the specific problem areas identified by this senior level policy group. In the last phase, the concepts were integrated
into a coordinated whole and out-briefed to a panel of senior and very experienced practitioners of complex
contingency operations.
Outcomes
All training objectives were met during this first formal training session. Participant critiques were encouraging; all
involved acknowledged that while PDD-56 mandated training for managing complex emergencies, the experience had

truly added value to the entire interagency process. Participants in the December 1997 session confirmed the need for a
continuing education program for members of the federal interagency community.
Those officials who participated in the training acquired a practical understanding of interagency tasks and
responsibilities. During their exposure to the pol-mil plan as members of a simulated interagency working group
developing integrated policy guidance for a complex contingency operation, they came face-to-face with "intra" as
well as interagency cultures. Interestingly, the experience was sufficiently realistic that it highlighted the different
cultures, organizations, agendas, training philosophies, working modes, and sense of urgency among interagency
players.
Conclusions
Success in complex contingency operations requires that all aspects of a crisis--political, military, law and order,
security, economic, and humanitarian assistance--be addressed nearly simultaneously in a coordinated manner. Most
members of the US interagency community recognize that these coordination challenges exist; many have experienced
firsthand the difficulties that can arise if planners fail to address them. Many have also learned important lessons over
the past years and have developed innovative techniques to improve coordination and accountability within their own
organizations and within the government during these operations. These initiatives have proven their worth during our
responses to recent complex emergencies.
Most of the experience with alternative planning tools and methodologies resides with those who first developed and
used them. There is a risk, therefore, that when these people leave public service, or even depart their current posts, the
lessons and procedures will go with them. The PDD-56 training program seeks to broaden the base of experience by
sharing these tools within and between agencies to develop and maintain proficiency with planning methods proven
suitable to the demands of complex emergencies.
The first formal federal government interagency training program was the product of a two-year effort to record and
share an improved concept for interagency planning for complex emergencies and the lessons learned from previous
contingency operations dating back to the US experience in Somalia. This effort included vetting strategic lessons
learned at a very high level within the government and designing, testing, and conducting a phased prototype training
and education program that introduced planning tools to those who would likely use them in a complex emergency.
The training gave key members of the interagency community a chance to evaluate the tools and suggest additional
refinements. Future interagency training opportunities will depend upon the resolve of leaders within all affected
agencies to develop the potential inherent in PDD-56 and its pol-mil plan through training and maintenance of
standard operating procedures.[10]
It remains to be seen if US government agencies will internalize the training requirement prescribed in PDD-56. The
need for interagency expertise in managing complex contingency operations is apparent to most participants. It will
require leadership from the National Security Council and a commitment to policy integration by US government
agencies to ensure that this pol-mil planning imperative does not fail for lack of interest. The military, particularly the
US Army with its unique capabilities and requirements during an intervention, has a powerful vested interest in the
success of PDD-56.
NOTES
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1. The National Security Advisor's foreword to the "Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency
Operations (Draft-Working Papers)." Once published, it will be available through US government sources.
2. White Paper, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential

Decision Directive 56," May 1997, p. 3.
3. Ibid., p. 6.
4. At a meeting conducted in the White House Conference Center on 15 September 1995, the National Security
Council approved the interagency training proposal presented by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Strategy
and Requirements. There were three phases in the pilot program. In the first phase (September 1995) lessons learned
from previous operations were discussed and a pol-mil plan template was presented. The second phase, in November
and December 1995, highlighted the development of a pol-mil plan and a rehearsal outbrief to the EXCOMM. The
third phase, at Carlisle Barracks, Pa., in early February 1996, produced a pol-mil plan for a simulated operation in
Eastern Zaire. While there was consensus that the training sessions were extremely beneficial, the program was
shortened to two and a half days to conserve time. A training session in December 1996 assembled action officers,
office directors, Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and an Executive Committee to produce a pol-mil plan, review it, test it
for coordination and integration, and conduct a rehearsal of it. The stage was set for a formal training session in
December 1997.
5. The following federal agencies participated: National Security Council, Department of Defense (Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, US Atlantic Command, US Pacific Command, US Forces Korea), Department of
State, US Agency for International Development, US Information Agency, Department of Transportation, Department
of Justice, and Department of Agriculture. Active participation by the National Security Council is essential to give
this training the requisite credibility, command emphasis, and sense of urgency.
6. Managing Complex Contingency Operations, Interagency Coordination Simulation, 10-12 December 1997, National
Foreign Affairs Training Center.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. The handbook is currently known as the "Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency
Operations (Draft-Working Papers)." Once published it will be available through US government sources.
10. Training currently is being conducted on a regular basis by the National Foreign Affairs Training Center, National
Defense University, and the US Army War College's Peacekeeping Institute. A PDD-56 basic literacy course was
conducted in September 1998 at the National Defense University. This course familiarizes participants with PDD-56; it
could be made exportable to requesting agencies. The next formal PDD-56 training session is tentatively scheduled for
December 1998 at the Foreign Service Institute in Washington.
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